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ABSTRACT：The Sah-Stiglitz "Economics of Price Scissors" model, concerning the 
political economy of price scissors, formulates the optimal terms of trade against 
peasants. In the present paper, by extending this model to an open economy and 
allowing agricultural rationing, we first check if the model stands up to China’s data 
and, if so, we estimate its key structural parameters. Using province-level panel data 
from 1949-1992, we find that the importance of peasants in the government’s 
objective function is less than the importance of workers. In addition, the importance 
of consumption is also less than that of investment. Such findings are consistent the 
reality in China. 
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As introduced by Preobrahensky (1926), the term of "price scissors" refers to how the
government in a developing country, especially a socialist country, uses to extract pro￿ts
from peasants in the rural sector to subsidize workers in the urban sector. As a result, the
government in this setting could increase capital accumulation using price scissors. Later,
Sah and Stiglitz (1984) (henceforth S-S) proposed an elegant theoretical model to formalize
the optimal terms of trade versus peasants by analyzing the government￿ s social welfare
function. Perhaps because of the paper￿ s simple but powerful theoretical structure, it was
quickly applied in a variety of subsequent theoretical analysis. For instance, Carter (1986)
extended the S-S model from a closed-economy to an open-economy setup. Blomqvist
(1986) examined the case of indirect taxation from agricultural goods in socialist countries.
These studies recognized that price scissors have been important in socialist countries such
as former Soviet Union and China.
More importantly, traditional wisdom suggests that governments in socialist countries
give more attention to investment than to consumption and more weight to workers than
to peasants. However, this wisdom is a priori. In this study, we investigate if the view
is borne out by China￿ s data. And, if so, to what extent the government favors urban
workers over rural peasants and future investment over current consumption.
We develop a theoretical setup based on the S-S (1984) model. To explore the optimal
terms of trade versus peasants, the S-S model (1984) used the Bergson-Samuelson social
welfare function to assign a relative weight between current consumption and capital
1accumulation. In addition, welfare from both workers and peasants is equivalent in the
mind of the social planner. Such a simpli￿cation is helpful for us to estimate two relative
weights: the weight of current consumption relative to future investment and the weight
of peasants relative to workers.
We estimate related structural parameters to investigate the relative importance of
agricultural and industrial sectors and the relative importance of investment and con-
sumption in the social planner￿ s mind by using China￿ s province-level panel data from
1949-1992, during which China used central planning. We tailor and extend the S-S￿ s
(1984) theoretical model to ￿t the case of China by allowing international trade and agri-
cultural rationing. Indeed, China had a low openness ratio but it had never actually been a
closed economy even before its economic reforms began in 1978.1 Moreover, di⁄erent from
S-S (1984) by restricting the weight of welfare between peasants and workers, we allow
the model to demonstrate its own ￿ exibility and let data predict the model￿ s magnitude.
In line with S-S, we maintain the relative weight between consumption and investment to
measure the social value of marginal investment.
In this paper, we also estimate the relative agricultural price elasticity of wages since
such data, though essential, are unavailable for our key structural estimations of the
relative weight between current consumption and future investment. The estimations of
such elasticities may certainly su⁄er from the usual measurement error problem due to data
unavailability, or they may be sensitive to di⁄erent estimation methods. It is possible such
1As pointed out by Naughton (2005), before 1979, China￿ s total trade/GDP ratio was around 10%. It
reached its minimum level of 5% in 1970-1971.
2measurement errors might create an endogeneity problem for our structural estimations.
We therefore address this problem by using appropriate instrumental variables.
So that our empirical speci￿cation is close to reality, we also add an extra variable,
the famine dummy, in the estimations and test whether it adds explanatory power to our
theoretical model. China su⁄ered a nation-wide famine during 1958-1961. Traditional
wisdom suggests that such a negative shock would a⁄ect the relative weights of the gov-
ernment￿ s objective function. We therefore add a variable to check this traditional belief.
The economic rationale is that, if such a variable adds extra explanatory power to our
theoretical model, this could be an indication that our theoretical setup is incomplete,
therefore suggesting an extension to the theoretical model for better empirical ￿t.
Our paper joins a small collection of the related papers. Remarkably, very few studies
have conducted empirical investigations of the price scissors although the S-S (1984) model
makes clear-cut empirical predictions. One exception is Li and Tsui (1990). Di⁄erent
from other theoretical studies that treat the former Soviet Union as the work-horse, they
use China as their sample of a developing country to test the Preobrazhensky￿ s First
Proposition that price scissors can help a country to extract an industrial surplus for
capital accumulation. They ￿nd evidence that the relative agricultural price is positively
correlated with the capital accumulation. They then explain this unexpected result using
the e¢ ciency wage hypothesis. Knight (1995, 1999) provides some interesting ￿ndings on
the rural-urban divide in China by analyzing changes in various o⁄er curves.
Our ￿ndings are important because we are able to retrieve the relative magnitude of
consumption and investment in the government￿ s objective function of China. In addition,
3we also calculate the weight of workers versus that of peasants. Our estimates suggest
that the weight of peasants is smaller than that of workers, and the weight of consumption
is much smaller than that of investment. Such ￿ndings are consistent with China￿reality.
Hence, our analysis explains China￿ s behavior during its planned-economy era quite well.
One potential limitation of our current approach is that we do not have feasible data on
China￿ s disaggregated province-level agricultural trade before 1978. To explore the e⁄ects
of price scissors on agricultural trade, it therefore is essential to run regressions using panel
data. Unfortunately, we cannot access such data from before China￿ s economic reforms.
Inspired by the gravity model in trade theory, we therefore seek to estimate the share of
manufacturing trade relative to the full trade volume by allowing heterogeneous foreign
demand behavior across provinces.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces on price
scissors in the context of China. Section 3 describes the theoretical framework based on
the S-S model. Section 4 speci￿es the econometric methods. Section 5 describes the data,
presents the empirical ￿ndings, and checks their robustness. Section 6 concludes the paper.
2 Price Scissors in China
Before the economic reforms, the prices of all commodities in China were set by the
government. As pointed out by Lin (2003, 2005, 2007), China, like many other less-
developed countries (LDC), adopted a heavy-industry-oriented development strategy after
gaining its political independence in 1949. Heavy industries were capital intensive. The
projects in heavy industries required huge capital inputs and long gestation. However,
4China was a capital-scarce agrarian economy at that time. Moreover, China￿ s political
leaders also emphasized the importance of self-reliance to raise such capital. Therefore,
the only way left to the government was to squeeze the agricultural surplus for investments
in heavy industries by lowering agricultural prices paid to peasants for their products while
raising the prices of industrial products sold to peasants. In a nutshell, under this strategy,
it was natural for the government to use price scissors against peasants in favor of industrial
development.
Figure 1 helps us to understand the essence of price scissors. Without the government￿ s
intervention, the relative price for agricultural products is determined by the market di-
rectly and yields (pA=pI)0. To squeeze bene￿ts out of peasants for its future investment,
the government sets a lower relative price (pA=pI)1 for agricultural goods, which yields an
excess demand for agricultural goods. In the absence of price adjustments, the government
has to import agricultural goods to meet the demand. But this was infeasible since China
had scarce foreign reserves in this period. Therefore, the only way left to the government
was that it had to ration its agricultural goods. Put another way, the demand curve is
regulated to be a vertical. By rationing agricultural goods, not only did the government
not have to import agricultural goods but it could also export its agricultural goods to
create foreign reserves.
[Insert Figure 1 Here]
Following previous works like Lardy (1983), we de￿ne price scissors (p) as the relative
ratio between the purchasing price index of farm products (pA) and the rural retail price
5index of industrial products (pI). That is, p ￿ pA=pI.2 Figure 2 shows that the relative
price index for agricultural goods increases over these years. 3 However, such an increase is
not fully attributable to the price scissors against peasants since prices of all commodities
were not completely set by the government after 1984.4
[Insert Figure 2 Here]
China began its economic reforms in 1978. Instead of adopting shock therapy, China
implemented dual-track gradual reforms in its transition to a market economy. As dis-
cussed by Lin, Cai, and Li (1996), such a dual-track price system includes two stages. In
the ￿rst stage, from 1978 to 1984, the government merely focused on adjusting agricultural
prices relative to industrial prices.
In contrast, in the second stage, from 1985 to 1992, the government aimed at intro-
ducing a market track parallel to the planned track. In this stage, some key commodities
were still included in various state plans. The prices for these commodities were set by the
government just as before the economic reforms. The prices of the commodities excluded
from the state plans were directly determined by the market. Accordingly, there were
three types of prices setting during this stage: ￿xed state-regulated prices, state-guided
prices, and market-determined prices. In particular, in 1992, when China￿ s government
2As discussed by Li and Tsui (1990), the price ratio could also be measured by an alternative index,
pA=~ pI , where ~ pI is the ex-factory price index of industrial goods. In this paper, we measure the price
scissors using the pA=pI index since there are data missing in the alternative index.
3As shown in Figure 2, there was a jump in the purchasing price index of farm products (PPIFP) during
1959-1961 due to the great famine.
4Note that the relative agricultural price ratios are higher than one. However, this does not imply that
the agricultural price level is higher than the industrial price level since various price indices are calculated
using the Laspeyres formula.
6o¢ cially adopted its market economy, the weights of both ￿xed state-regulated prices and
state-guided prices accounted for only 7:1% of the entire economy. This decreased to less
than 5% in 1999. Put another way, 95% of all commodity prices were determined by
market forces by 1999.5
3 The Theoretical Framework
Our theoretical model is based on the S-S (1984) model. To ￿t our model to China￿ s case,
we extend the S-S model by allowing both international trade and agricultural rationing.
In addition, consumers￿utility functions in the S-S (1984) model are also modi￿ed to be
suitable for empirical estimations.
In our model, the economy consists of two sectors, the rural with population Na and
the urban with population Nm. People are sector-immobile but have identical utility
functions. Foe ease of estimation, we specify a quasi-linear utility in the S-S (1984) model:
Uj = yj + u(xj); (1)
where consumer j is from either the agricultural sector (a) or the urban manufacturing
sector (m). The sub-utility function is, as usual, increasing and di⁄erentiable with xj.
Consumer j￿ s consumption of manufacturing good y serves as the numeraire. Therefore,
all wealth e⁄ects are absorbed into the manufacturing sector, in the sense that agricultural
goods are necessities, whereas manufacturing goods are not necessarily necessities.
The industrial sector uses two factors, capital (K) and labor (Lm), to produce man-
5Source: State Planning Commission, Price Administration Bureau; "The Weights and Changes of
Three Patterns of Price," Price in China, 1997, No. 12.
7ufacturing products, whereas the agriculture sector depends on land (R) and labor (La).
Note that Lm and La measure the hours worked by each worker, who are sector-immobile
in this setup. This is exactly consistent with China￿ s reality: people are not easy to move
freely from region to region because of the residency-control policy (although such re-
strictions have been eased to some extent). Technologies in both industries have constant
returns to scale. Agricultural prices relative to industrial prices, p, are determined by the
government. Lower relative agricultural prices imply severe scissors.
A representative peasant with a utility function (1) faces a budget constraint as follows:
pxa + ya = pX(R=Na;La); (2)
where X is his/her agricultural production. The per capita land endowment is R=Na since
land areas are assumed to be evenly allocated among peasants in China. Accordingly, the
representative peasant￿ s indirect utility function, Va, is:
Va(p;Na) = max
xa
pX(R=Na;La) ￿ pxa + u(xa): (3)
From the envelope theorem, we have:
@Va=@p = X ￿ xa ￿ Sa; (4)
where the residual rural surplus, Sa, is de￿ned as X ￿ xa. Similarly, the wage rate (w),
which is set by the government, is the unique source of income for urban workers.6 This
suggests that the budget constraint for a representative urban worker is as follows:
pxm + ym = wLm: (5)
6Note that workers in China did not have capital endowment explicitly. According to China￿ s consti-
tution, all capital endowments belonged directly to the state.
8The representative worker also faces another constraint on agricultural rationing. That
is,
xm ￿ ￿ xm; (6)
where ￿ xm is the ration for per capita urban agricultural consumption. Therefore, we
obtain:
@Vm=@p = ￿￿ xm;@Vm=@w = Lm: (7)
Di⁄erent from the S-S (1984) model, we allow the country to have some foreign trade
(Carter, 1986). At the very least, China was never a closed economy after 1949. Even
before its economic reforms in 1978, it traded with some other socialist countries by ex-
porting agricultural products (Naughton, 2005). Given the depressed agricultural relative
price, one would expect countries like China that adopted price scissors to import agricul-
tural products to balance the excess demand. However, the government in China imposed
rationing on agricultural goods among urban workers. Therefore, the balanced equation
for agricultural goods is:
E = NaSa ￿ Nm￿ xm; (8)
where E is agricultural exports. Due to agricultural rationing, China actually exported
its agricultural goods, despite domestic demand.
The government exported agricultural goods at a given global price (pw), which was
higher than the domestic agricultural price due to the arti￿cial price depression at home.
The markup (￿ ￿ pw ￿ p) was collected as a part of the government surplus. Therefore,
9we have governmental surplus (G) as follows:
G = Nm[Y (K=Nm;Lm) ￿ wLm] + ￿E: (9)
That is, the government obtained a surplus from two sources: the industrial surplus and
net agricultural trade surplus. The industrial surplus is measured by the pro￿t retained in
the industrial sector. The last term on the right-hand-side (RHS) of (9) is the agricultural
trade surplus. Di⁄erent from usual setups in the trade literature to specify the tari⁄-like
markup as a function of the domestic price, the di⁄erence between domestic prices and
the rest of the world is random and irregular since the domestic price was set by the
government arbitrarily.7
The government maximizes its aggregate welfare by choosing the optimal relative price.
Following the S-S (1984) model, the government has the following objective function:
￿ = NaVa + ￿NmVm + ￿G: (10)
The ￿rst term on the RHS of (10) measures the aggregate welfare from the agricultural
sector, while NmVm is the aggregate welfare from the industrial sector. The coe¢ cient,
￿, measures the relative weight of the agricultural sector and the industrial sector in the
government￿ s objective function. Note that the government had surplus from both sectors
(G). The coe¢ cient, ￿, measures the social value of the marginal investment, which could
be treated as the relative weight of consumers￿surplus (consumption) and investment. We
assume that the government in China preferred capital accumulation for investment over
7Of course, one possible extension is to consider such a markup as a non-linear function of agricultural
prices.
10consumption and it also favored urban workers over rural peasants. However, these are a
priori assumptions. Our main interest in this paper is to estimate the two weights, ￿ and
￿, in the government￿ s objective function.
By substituting (9) into (10), we obtain:
￿ = NaVa + ￿NmVm + ￿Nm[Y (K=Nm;Lm) ￿ wLm] + ￿￿E: (11)
To determine the optimal terms of trade relative to peasants, we take the partial













By algebraic manipulation as shown in Appendix A, we obtain the equilibrium condi-
tion as follows:
pE ￿ (￿ ￿ 1)pNm￿ xm + (￿ ￿ ￿)(NmwLm)￿ = 0: (13)
Note that the ￿rst term of (13), pE, is agricultural exports. The second term, pNm￿ xm,
is aggregate agricultural urban consumption with rationing, which is observable from
the data. Included in the last term, NmwLm, is aggregate urban wages, and ￿ is the
wage elasticity with respect to the relative price of agricultural goods, which is de￿ned as
￿ ￿ (dw=dp) ￿ p=w.
4 The Econometric Model
Equation (13) sheds light on the essence of our empirical speci￿cation. The provincial
governments are expected to have the same government objective function as the central
11authority since, under the planed economy system in China, all local governments are
strictly monitored and controlled by the central government. Hence, our empirical speci￿-
cation relies on a province-level panel data set. However, there is no particular directional
guidance for the inclusion of an error term in the econometric model. We ￿rst consider a
speci￿cation as follows:
Cit = 1=(￿ ￿ 1) ￿ Ait + (￿ ￿ ￿)=(￿ ￿ 1) ￿ ￿Wit (14)
= ￿1 ￿ Ait + ￿2 ￿ ￿Wit + ￿i + ￿t + ￿it; (15)
where the regressand is the agricultural urban consumption under rationing (C ￿ pNm￿ xm).
It is mainly a⁄ected by agricultural exports (A ￿ pE), urban wages (W ￿ NmwLm),
and the relative agricultural price elasticity of wages (￿). The subscript i indicates the
province and t indicates the year. The error term is considered like any other factor that
a⁄ects agricultural urban consumption but not considered in our theoretical model. It
can be decomposed into three components: (1) province-speci￿c ￿xed e⁄ects, ￿i; which
capture unobserved province-speci￿c time-invariant ￿xed e⁄ects; (2) year-speci￿c time-
variant ￿xed e⁄ects, ￿t; and (3) an idiosyncratic e⁄ect, ￿it, with zero expectation and
heteroskedastic variance, ￿2
i. Our main objective in the remainder of the paper is to
estimate the two structural parameters, ^ ￿1 ￿ 1=(￿ ￿ 1) and ^ ￿2 ￿ (￿ ￿ ￿)=(￿ ￿ 1).
[Insert Figure 3 Here]
Without a doubt, such a speci￿cation is not unique to estimating (12). We could con-
sider at least two other optional empirical speci￿cations. The ￿rst is to move agricultural
12exports (Ait) to the left-hand-side (LHS). In this way, the other two variables, Cit and
￿Wit, serve as regressors. Alternatively, we can also take the term ￿Wit as the regressand
and put Ait and Cit on the RHS. Thus, it is natural to ask which speci￿cation is the most
suitable one. We adopt Speci￿cation (14) for following reasons.
First, compared to the alternative speci￿cation, which treats agricultural exports as
the regressand, Speci￿cation (14) allow us to dodge the di¢ culty of data unavailability.
As mentioned above, province-level agricultural trade data before 1978 are inaccessible.
A feasible way to address this challenge is to calculate an approximation by using infor-
mation on province-level GDP and total output of the industrial sector, which is speci￿ed
shortly. However, such an approximation could su⁄er from some measurement errors. In
econometrics, there is nothing wrong with putting it on the LHS since we could allow
such a measurement error to be incorporated into the error term. But we still su⁄er from
the second problem: we do not have data on the price elasticity of wages on the RHS.
Any estimation or data approximation of this elasticity could create another source of
measurement error on the RHS.
Similarly, we can make ￿Wit the regressand. Clearly, the measurement error of the
calculated price elasticity would be passed through the error term. However, since we
have no data on agricultural trade, the measurement error from the approximation of
agricultural trade could easily cause our estimation to be biased. Hence, we avoid this
approach and focus on Speci￿cation (14) instead.
134.1 Agricultural Export
To estimate (14), we need province-level agricultural export data. Unfortunately, such
disaggregated trade data before 1978 are unavailable. We only have national-level data
before 1978. To resolve this empirical challenge, we construct an approximation for the
"true" province-level agricultural export data by using the gravity trade model.
The gravity equation in the trade model predicts that export volume is directly propor-
tional to the exporter￿ s GDP. This prediction holds at the disaggregated industry level and
the province level (Helpman, 1987). Put another way, province i￿ s exports (Tit) are directly
proportional to its output (Qit). Therefore, we have Tit = ￿itQit where ￿it measures the
share of foreign demand for province i￿ s products in year t:8 By the same token, the share
of foreign demand for province i￿ s manufacturing products is ￿m




it is province i ￿ s output of manufacturing commodities at year t. Accordingly,





it=￿it measures the ratio of demand for manufacturing products relative to that for
all commodities. Agricultural exports (Ait) are the di⁄erence between total exports (Tit)
and manufacturing exports (Mit): Ait = Tit ￿ Mit.9 That is, agricultural exports are:
Ait = Tit ￿ sm
it(Qm
it=Qit)Tit: (16)
Note that we have data on Qm
it, Qit, and Tit . In contrast, the relative demand ratio, sm
it,
is left for estimation.
8For example, if ￿it = 1, then all province i￿ s products are exported. Conversely, if ￿it = 0; then
province i exports no commodities.
9Note that China￿ s exports from the service sector were very small in the period 1949-1992 (Naughton,
2005).
14Agricultural exports after 1978 were directly calculated by the di⁄erence between
province-level agricultural production and province-level agricultural consumption (i.e.,
urban plus rural). Note that we do not directly use foreign trade data since inter-province
trade, which is taken into account after 1978, is allowable based on our setup. However,
we are unable to do so before 1978 and we have found no signi￿cant way to the estimates
due to data restrictions.
4.2 Relative Agricultural Price Elasticity of Wage
There are three possible ways to obtain wage elasticity with respect to prices. The ￿rst
is to use data from previous studies. To the best of our knowledge, very few studies, if
any, provide such elasticities over the years in this study. The second possible way is to
calculate elasticities directly by de￿nition, ￿it ￿ [(dw=dp) ￿ p=w]it, which is technically
feasible. However, this does not make sense economically. The elasticity should not be
expected to vary across provinces given that each province in China rarely had autonomy
under the central planning system. It also should not ￿ uctuate frequently over the years
since the main economic indicators and important economic policies were determined by
￿ve-year national plans. Therefore, the only way is to estimate the price elasticity of wages
indirectly. We therefore consider a two-way, ￿xed-e⁄ect speci￿cation as follows:
lnwit = ￿ + ￿ lnpit + #i + ￿t + eit; (17)
where the estimated coe¢ cient, ^ ￿, is interpreted as the elasticity of wages with respect to
relative prices of agricultural goods. As usual, the province-speci￿c and year-speci￿c ￿xed
e⁄ects control for other unspeci￿ed factors. We could undoubtedly suspect that there
15are some measurement errors in this simple speci￿cation. It may be a good benchmark
speci￿cation, but it is certainly noisy since we have no idea about the "true" speci￿cation of
a reduced-form estimation. In other words, the endogeneity issue caused by measurement
errors may be a concern in (14). Two-stage least square (TSLS) estimation is a powerful
econometric method to control for endogeneity issues created by measurement errors.10
We therefore address the endogeneity issue by adopting appropriate instruments.
However, it is reasonable to believe that such an elasticity should be di⁄erent when the
economy faces a structural change. We therefore estimate the elasticities by separating
the entire period 1949-1992 into three sub-period, using 1978 and 1992 as the two cut-o⁄
points. The results are reported in Table 2.
Now, we combine (14) with (17) to derive the new equilibrium condition for the esti-
mations:
Cit = 1=(￿ ￿ 1) ￿ Tit + (￿ ￿ ￿)=(￿ ￿ 1) ￿ ￿Wit ￿ sm=(￿ ￿ 1) ￿ (Qm
it=Qit)Tit: (18)
To ease of the estimations, we presume that the relative demand ratio for manufac-
turing products is identical across provinces and years: sm
it = sm. One might suspect
that such a simpli￿cation could cause some bias since China￿ s trade pattern before 1978
was di⁄erent from that after 1978. Before 1978, China exported almost only agricultural
commodities. We therefore add an indicator, It, (which equals one after 1978 and zero
otherwise) into the empirical speci￿cation as follows:
Cit = ￿0 + ￿1 ￿ Tit + ￿2 ￿ ^ ￿Wit + ￿3 ￿ (Qm
it=Qit)Tit ￿ It + ￿i + ￿t + ￿it; (19)
10Wooldridge (2002, chapter 5) provides a careful analysis of this topic.
16where ^ ￿1 = 1=(￿ ￿1), ^ ￿2 = (￿ ￿￿)=(￿ ￿1), and ^ ￿3 = sm=(1￿￿): Put another way, when
we consider cases before 1978, the term (Qm
it=Qit)Tit ￿ It disappears given that It = 0.
Therefore, the export volume simply equals the agricultural export volume.
5 Data and Empirical Results
In this section, we ￿rst describe the data sets used in the analysis followed by a presentation
of our benchmark empirical results. To control for the endogeneity problem, we then o⁄er
an analysis of the validity of the instruments. Finally, we close the section with a discussion
of China￿ s economy in di⁄erent periods.
To estimate (19), we need data on urban agricultural consumption (Cit), total ex-
port (Tit), aggregate wages (Wit), province-level manufacturing output (Qm
it), total output
(Qit), and price elasticity of wages (￿). As mentioned above, data on price elasticity of
wages are unavailable but the magnitudes can be estimated instead. Data on China￿ s ex-
ports in our sample are converted from US dollars to Chinese Yuan using the spot o¢ cial
exchange rates. In addition, we choose 1950 as the base year for the relative price index.
All data can be directly accessed from China Compendium of Statistics, 1949-2004, pub-
lished by the China Bureau of Statistics. Table 1 presents the basic statistical information
for each variable.
[Insert Table 1 Here]
175.1 Benchmark Estimates
Table 2 presents the estimates of the relative price elasticity of wages. Column (1) reports
the whole period of our sample (1949-1992). The rest of Table 2 considers three di⁄erent
perturbations for di⁄erent time periods: Column (2) is for 1949-1977, Column (3) is for
1978-1984, and Column (4) is for 1985-1992.
[Insert Table 2 Here]
Following (17), we ￿rst run the ￿xed-e⁄ect estimations for di⁄erent time periods. It
turns out that the relative price elasticity of wages is ￿0:083 for the whole period though
statistically insigni￿cant. The economic rationale is straightforward. The lower the agri-
cultural relative price is, the higher the urban wage is. Note that the lower agricultural
relative price implies a larger price scissors. When the government imposes a strong price
e⁄ect on peasants, urban workers￿real income will increase relatively since they consume
necessary goods at a very low cost.
As shown in Table 2, the coe¢ cients on the agricultural relative price elasticity of
wages are all negative. Most of them are statistically signi￿cant except for period 1978-
1984. It is not a surprise to have measurement errors for such estimated magnitudes given
that we have no idea about the "true" reduced-form speci￿cation of the e⁄ect of prices on
wages. But, as mentioned above, we can address this problem by using the instrumental
variables approach.
Our benchmark OLS estimation results of Speci￿cation (19) are reported in Column (1)
of Table 3. The coe¢ cient of urban agricultural consumption, ^ ￿1, is 0:01 but statistically
18insigni￿cant. Correspondingly, the coe¢ cient of the product of the price elasticity and the
urban wages, ^ ￿2, is ￿19:58. After controlling for the province-speci￿c and year-speci￿c
￿xed e⁄ects in Column (3), the coe¢ cient of ^ ￿1changes to be signi￿cant.
5.2 Endogeneity and Instrumental Variables
The endogeneity problem of Speci￿cation (19) could come from measurement errors in
the price elasticity. As mentioned above, we do not have data on agricultural relative
price elasticity of wages. Instead we use the OLS estimated coe¢ cient obtained from
Speci￿cation (17). It is natural to suspect that there are measurement errors between the
estimated elasticity coe¢ cient and the "true" inaccessible data.
To identify the accurate weights in the government￿ s objective function, we needs to
control for the endogeneity problem. Otherwise, the related estimates would be suspect. A
powerful econometric technique to address the endogeneity is to perform two-stage gener-
alized method of moments (GMM) estimations by adopting appropriate instrumental vari-
ables. Note that the equilibrium condition (13) implies no causal relationship among each
variable. Therefore, the GMM estimation is an ideal approach. Moreover, GMM requires
fewer assumptions on the error term and has the ability to generate heteroscedasticity-
robust standard errors as compared to the general least squares method (Hall, 2004).
We use investment in capital construction and ￿xed-asset investment in innovation as
instruments of the price elasticity for following reasons. Lower investments in innovation
and capital construction, which are signals of insu¢ cient investment by the government,
would push the government to depress agricultural prices much more (a lower relative
19price), which in turn would lead to higher real wages. Indeed, the negative relationship
between investments in innovation and capital construction and wages are con￿rmed by
our samples. The simple correlation between investment in capital construction and wages
is ￿0:93 while the one between investment in innovation and wages is ￿0:94:
Moreover, estimates from the two stages of GMM o⁄er supporting evidence for the
instrument￿ s validity. An instrument (i.e., ￿xed-asset investment in innovation or capital
construction) is good if it a⁄ects the regressand (i.e., urban agricultural consumption)
through and only through the instrumented variable (i.e., price elasticity of wages). To
justify this, we perform several useful tests as follows.
First, we perform Anderson￿ s (1984) canonical correlation likelihood-ratio test to check
whether or not the excluded instruments (i.e., ￿xed-asset investment in innovation and
investment in capital construction) are correlated with the endogenous regressor. The
null hypothesis that the model is under identi￿ed is rejected at the 1% level. Second, we
go a step further to see whether or not such instruments are weakly correlated with the
price elasticity of wages. If so, then the estimates will perform poorly in this two-step
GMM. Luckily enough, the Cragg and Donald (1993) F-statistics provide strong evidence
to reject the null hypothesis that the ￿rst stage is weakly identi￿ed at a highly signi￿cant
level. Third, the Anderson and Rubin (1949) ￿2 statistic rejects the null hypothesis that
the coe¢ cients of the endogenous regressors jointly equal zero. Fourth, the Hanson-Sargen
over-identi￿cation test also con￿rms that the instruments are valid (p-value = 0:45). In
short, all of these statistical tests give us su¢ cient con￿dence that the instruments perform
well, and, therefore, the speci￿cation is valid.
20Finally, we provide an easy-to-interpret version for the validity of the instrument. We
add both the ￿xed-asset investment in innovation and the investment in capital construc-
tion as exogenous regressors. If these two variables have a direct e⁄ect on agricultural
net exports, then we would expect the estimated coe¢ cients to be statistically signi￿cant.
However, as shown in the last column of Table 3, they are statistically insigni￿cant at the
5% level.11 This again a¢ rms that these two variables a⁄ect the regressand through and
only through the channel of the instrumented variables.
Columns (2) and (4) of Table 3 show the estimation results using the IV approach. The
IV estimation results are broadly consistent with those from the OLS estimates. Column
(4) reports the ￿xed-e⁄ect IV estimates. The coe¢ cients for the two key variables, Tit and
￿Wit, are statistically signi￿cant and very close to those in the FE estimates in Column
(3).
5.3 Robustness Checks
China su⁄ered from a country-wide famine that lasted for around three years during 1959-
1961. We wonder if China￿ s government adjusted the objective function when it faced
this a negative shock. In Table 4, we add one more control variable, dummy of famine
(i.e., equals to one for years 1959-1961 and zero otherwise), to check if our estimation
results reported in Table 3 are robust. After controlling for the two-way ￿xed e⁄ects, the
coe¢ cients of all variables are very close to those in Table 3. In addition, the famine had
a negative e⁄ect, though insigni￿cant, on lowering urban agricultural consumption. Such
11We also take ￿xed-asset investment in innovation and investment in capital construction as extra
regressors, separately, and also ￿nd that they are statistically insigni￿cant.
21a ￿nding is also broadly consistent with China￿ s reality during that period.
[Insert Table 4 Here]
We have already explored the heterogeneity of the price index in di⁄erent periods.
Similarly, China￿ s trade pattern has changed over the years. Before 1978, the year that
China began its economic reforms, the components of China￿ s foreign trade were relatively
simple. The openness ratio (i.e., the sum of exports and imports relative to the GDP) was
only around 5%. Most of China￿ s exportable goods were agricultural products (Naughton,
2005). In the late 1970s, China also began to export oil because the petroleum production
from China￿ s main ￿eld in Daqing, Heilongjiang, began to soar. Later, China￿ s foreign
trade expanded steadily during the 1980s. The openness ratio increased from 0:13 in 1980
to 0:34 in 1992. China￿ s exports also diversi￿ed from an initial heavy dependence on
primary commodities to a mix of primary goods and manufacturing products. The share
of exported primary goods decreased from 49:7% in 1980 to 20:0% in 1992. In contrast,
the share of exported machinery and transportation equipment increased from 4:65% in
1980 to 15:5% in 1992.12
Given that China￿ s economy structure was quite di⁄erent before and after 1978, we ￿rst
split our sample spread into two di⁄erent periods using 1978 as a cut-o⁄year. We also take
1985 as another cut-o⁄ point since the economic reforms before and after 1985 were quite
di⁄erent as introduced above. Table 5 reports the estimation results for 1978-1992 by using
12The data source is China Statistical Yearbook (2006) published by the National Bureau of Statistics
of China.
22precise province-level agricultural export data.13 Various econometric approaches suggest
that urban agricultural consumption is positively correlated with agricultural exports,
but negatively correlated with the product of wages and price elasticity. The two key
coe¢ cients, ^ ￿1and ^ ￿2, are statistically signi￿cant in all speci￿cations. The magnitude of
^ ￿2 is much lower than its counterpart for the whole period, 1949-1992. Column (5) provides
an easy-to-intrepret version on the validity of the instruments during the 1978-1992 period.
[Insert Table 5 Here]
We go further to specify the period after 1978 into two sub-periods: 1978-1984 and
1985-1992. We report the estimation results in the lower parts of Table 6. The signs of
the two key coe¢ cients are consistent with those in Table 5. Most of the estimates are
signi￿cant. The only exception is the coe¢ cient ^ ￿1 during the period 1978-1984 in the IV
￿xed-e⁄ect estimations, which is discussed below.
[Insert Table 6 Here]
5.4 Weights Identi￿cation
Based on the estimation results obtained from Tables 4-6, we are ready to retrieve the
weights in the government￿ s objective function. We normalize the weight of the agricultural
sector as a unity in (10). Accordingly, the relative weight of the manufacturing sector is ￿ in
the government￿ s objective function. ￿ measures the relative weight of investment relative
to consumption. By comparing (18) to (19), we can precisely identify the magnitudes of
13We do not report estimation results for years 1949-1977 here since data on agricultural trade before
1978 are completely unavailable.
23the weights: ￿ = 1=^ ￿1 +1and ￿ = (1￿ ^ ￿2)=^ ￿1 +1. We are therefore able to retrieve these
weights once the estimates of both ￿ and ￿ are statistically signi￿cant.
The results on the weights are presented in Table 7. We ￿rst report the weights when
estimated without controlling for endogeneity and the ￿xed-e⁄ect speci￿cation. As seen
in the top section in Table 7, the OLS estimates suggest that the relative weight for urban
workers is insigni￿cant. The calculated weights from the OLS estimates indeed have some
bias due to the endogeneity problem. Hence, we go a step further to calculate the relative
weights in the government￿ s objective function after controlling for endogeneity.
The two coe¢ cients are signi￿cant in the IV ￿xed-e⁄ect estimate, which suggests that
the weight for urban workers is 39:5 while the weight for future investment is 945:2. The
strikingly high number is beyond our expectations,14 but its implication is very clear: the
welfare of urban workers was more important than that of peasants in the view of China￿ s
government during the planned economy era. China￿ s government also cared more about
investment than about consumption. In addition, the weight for investment is much larger
than the weight for workers. We therefore conclude that China￿ s government paid much
more attention to investment than to workers during 1949-1992.
[Insert Table 7 Here]
We expect that things were di⁄erent before and after 1978. Before the economic
reforms, the primary objective of China￿ s government was to develop its heavy industries
so that China could catch up with the advanced countries like the U.S. and the U.K. as
14The large number of ￿ comes from the relatively large magnitude of the estimated coe¢ cient, ^ ￿2, which
in turn is caused by the lack of precise province-level data on agricultural exports.
24soon as possible (Lin, Cai, and Li, 1994). But, since the reforms in 1978, the government
has paid more attention to improving citizens￿living standard. In other words, government
has cared less about investments and more about consumption since the economic reforms
began. Our estimation results provide evidence to support this dynamic change. As seen
in the middle section of Table 7, the IV ￿xed-e⁄ect estimates suggest that, during the
1978-1992 period, China still paid more attention to investments than to consumption
(￿ = 8:26). It also cared about urban workers more than about rural peasants (￿ = 8:25).
However, the magnitudes of these two weights shrank dramatically compared to those
before 1978.
The bottom section of Table 7 reports the weights in the government￿ s objective func-
tion during two di⁄erent stages of its economic reforms. During 1978-1984, the weight
for investments for 1978-1992, 8:26, is smaller than its counterpart for 1978-1984, 30:6,
but larger than that for years 1985-1992, 7:00: This implies that China￿ s government lost
interest in its heavy industries over the years. Similarly, we ￿nd that China￿ s government
also was more egalitarian toward both rural peasants and urban workers over the years.
Interestingly, the structural parameter, ￿, was insigni￿cant for 1978-1984 in the IV
￿xed-e⁄ect estimate. This is exactly consistent with China￿ s reality. At the initial stage
of the economic reforms, the government did not have a clear direction for its reforms.
Indeed, its reform logic was usually described as "crossing the river by groping for the
stone".
256 Concluding Remarks
Fully guided by a theoretical model introduced by S-S(1984), in the present paper, we
estimate the structural parameters in the government￿ s objective function of China. We
￿nd that the weight attached to the welfare of workers is much higher than that to the wel-
fare of peasants. Furthermore, the government also paid much more attention to future
investment than to current consumption. Overall, our estimates suggest that an aug-
mented version of S-S￿ s (1984) model ￿ts China￿ s reality quite well, and it is also useful in
explaining the magnitude of political consideration in the government￿ s mind.
Like other structural parameter estimates, our estimates enjoy several advantages.
First, since our estimates closely depend on a theoretical model, we are able to see the
connection of each structural variable. Second, the structural parameter estimates are
also helpful in avoiding the arbitrage speci￿cations that commonly occur in reduced-form
estimates. The economic meaning of each corresponding estimated coe¢ cient is also clear.
The magnitudes of the structural variables in our speci￿cation are not only statistically
but also economically signi￿cant.
Our study also has implications for China. Although the phenomenon of using price
scissors against peasants o¢ cially ended in the early 1990s. China￿ s government still
maintains various price controls in some areas. The manipulated exchange rate policy is
an excellent example. It is true that today￿ s price controls di⁄er from the price scissors
used against peasants, but, in essence, the economic meaning behind these policies is, to
some extent, similar in terms of the government￿ s political concern.
26As in any ambitious attempt to marry a complicated structural parameters model
to imperfect data, we have made a variety of compromises here. Since we do not have
disaggregated data on province-level agricultural exports before 1978, we use a proxy or
estimated value as a substitute. Clearly, it would be better to use the "actual" data to
estimate the government￿ s objective function in China, which could be a possible avenue
for future research.
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29Appendix A
From (11), we know that
￿ = NaVa + ￿NmVm + ￿Nm[Y (K=Nm;Lm) ￿ wLm] + ￿￿E:
To determine the optimal terms of trade against peasants, we take the partial derivative

























= NaSa ￿ ￿Nm￿ xm + NmLm(￿ ￿ ￿)
dw
dp














where the second equality is from (4) and (7). The third equality rearranges the term
￿Nm￿ xm, the fourth equality is from (8) and de￿nes the price elasticity of wages as ￿ ￿
(dw=dp) ￿ p=w. Finally, we multiple p on both sides to obtain Speci￿cation (13):
pE ￿ (￿ ￿ 1)pNm￿ xm + (￿ ￿ ￿)(NmwLm)￿ = 0:
￿
30Appendix Table 1: Main Notation of the Models
Symbol De￿nition
Panel A: Theoretical Framework
p Agricultural price relative to industrial price
w Hourly wage
￿ Wage elasticity relative to price
Na;Nm Population of the rural and urban sectors, respectively
Lm;La Hours worked by the representative in manufacturing and agricultural sectors, respectively.
Va; A representative peasant (a)￿ s indirect utility
Vm A representative worker (m)￿ s indirect utility
xj Consumer j￿ s agricultural consumption, 8j = a;m
￿ xm Ration of urban worker￿ s agricultural consumption
yj Consumer j￿ s manufacturing consumption, 8j = a;m
X Production of agricultural goods
Y Production of industrial goods
K Capital input for the manufacturing sector
R Land input for the agricultural sector.
Sa Residual rural surplus: Sa = X ￿ xa
G The government￿ s surplus
￿ The government￿ s objective function
￿ Relative weight between peasants and workers
￿ Relative weight between consumption and investment
￿ Agricultural trade markup
Panel B: Empirical Speci￿cation
Ait Value of agricultural exports in province i in year t: Ait = pEit
Tit Value of total exports, which is the sum of agricultural and manufacturing exports
given Tit = Ait + Mit
Mit Value of agricultural export which equals Mit = sm
it(Y m
it =Yit)Tit where sm
it ￿ ￿m
it=￿it:
Qit Total output level of province i in year t
Qm
it Output level of manufacturing products in province i in year t
Cit Agricultural consumption from urban workers, Cit = pNmxm
#i Province-speci￿c ￿xed e⁄ects for Speci￿cation (16)
￿t Year-speci￿c ￿xed e⁄ects for Speci￿cation (16)
￿i Province-speci￿c ￿xed e⁄ects for Speci￿cation (18)
￿t Year-speci￿c ￿xed e⁄ects for Speci￿cation (18)
Wit Urban wages, Wit = NmwLm
￿it Idiosyncratic random variable
31Figure 1: Price Scissors, Agricultural Rationing, and Trade
Notes: When the government creates a price scissors (PA
PI )1 against the peasants, the market has excess
demand for agricultural goods, Nmxm
NmY ￿ NaSa
NmY ; where Sa is the per capita rural residual agricultural
supply. Therefore, the country experiences import demand pressure on agricultural goods. However,
the agricultural rationing for urban workers, as shown by the vertical line for the urban agricultural
relative demand, Nm￿ xm
NmY , not only o⁄sets such import demand but also creates agricultural excess supply,
NaSa
NmY ￿ Nm￿ xm
NmY . Accordingly, the country exports agricultural goods under the e⁄ects of both price scissors
and rationing.
32Figure 2: China￿ s Various Price Indices
Notes: the price scissors are de￿ned as the relative ratio between the purchasing price index of farm
products (PPIFP) and the rural retail price index of industrial products (RRPIIP). Sources for such data
are from the "China Compendium of Statistics, 1949-2004" by China Statistics Press, 2006.
33Table 1: Descriptive Statistics of Variables
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum
Total Exports 127.53 597.04 0 10148.27
Workers (Million people) 333.52 217.59 14.7 1045.2
Average Wage (Yuan) 1088.29 667.99 105.2 4273
Total Wages 42.25 48.08 0.69 345.55
Relative Agricultural Price Index (Year 1950=100) 212.90 89.19 97.60 682.62
Urban Consumption of Agricultural goods 62.17 88.05 0.04 679.96
Investment in Capital Construction 94.56 106.08 2.28 921.75
Fixed-Asset Investment in Innovation 16.26 20.32 0.01 128.57
Sources: Data are from "China Compendium of Statistics, 1949-2004" by China Statistics Press, 2006.
Unless speci￿ed, units for all variables are 100 million yuan.
Table 2: Estimated Agricultural Relative Price Elasticity of Wages
Wage Elasticity 1949-1992 1949-1977 1978-1992 1978-1984 1985-1992
FE Estimates -0.083 -0.293** -0.117** -0.049 -0.130**
(-0.94) (-3.40) (-2.23) (-0.69) (-2.40)
Notes: Numbers in parenthesis are t-value. **(*) denotes signi￿cance at 1 (5)% respectively. Province-
speci￿c and year-speci￿c ￿xed e⁄ects are not reported here to save space, though they are available upon
request.
34Table 3: Estimates for Structural Parameters (1949-1992)
Econometric Methodsa (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) IV
Regressand (Urban Agricultural Consumption) OLS IV FEb IV+FEb Included
Total Exports (Tit) 0.01 0.02 0.02** 0.03** 0.03*
(0.52) (1.16) (2.22) (2.33) (1.80)
Product of Urban Wages and Elasticity (￿Wit) -19.58** -20.31** -22.71** -23.55** -18.21**




Qit TitIit) 0.02 -0.01 -0.04 -0.05* -0.05
(0.56) (0.27) (1.46) (1.77) (1.12)
Investment in Capital Construction 0.45
(1.56)
Fixed Asset Investment in Innovation -0.013
(0.08)
F-statistics 1687.3z 1990.3z 446.1z 33,374z 1256.2z
First-Stage F-statistics 376.36
Anderson Likelihood-ratio statistic 710.1z
Cragg-Donald F statistic 1944.1z
Anderson-Rubin ￿2 Statistic 627.4 z
Shea Partial R2 0.83
Sargen Over-identi￿cation Test 0.58
p-value of Sargen Over-identi￿cation Test 0.45
R2 0.97 0.96 0.95 0.94 0.96
Prob.>F or Prob.>￿2 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Notes: a. Numbers in parenthesis are the t (z)-values. **(*) denotes signi￿cance at 1 (5)%. z indicates
p-value of the statistic is less than 0.01.
b. Time-speci￿c and province-speci￿c ￿xed e⁄ects are included.
35Table 4: Augmented Model Estimations (1949-1992)
-
Econometric Methodsa (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) IV
Regressand (Urban Agricultural Consumption) OLS IV FE IV+FEb Included
Total Exports (Tit) 0.01 0.01 0.02** 0.03** 0.03*
(0.53) (1.17) (2.22) (2.33) (1.80)
Product of Urban Wages and Elasticity (￿Wit) -19.61** -20.35** -22.71** -23.55** -18.24**




Qit TitIit) 0.02 -0.01 -0.04 -0.05* -0.05
(0.55) (0.29) (1.46) (1.77) (1.13)
Dummy of Famine 2.96** 6.82** -8.97 -7.77 5.85**
(3.14) (4.34) (0.92) (0.51) (4.92)
Investment in Capital Construction 0.45
(1.55)
Fixed Asset Investment in Innovation -0.01
(0.08)
F-statistics 1536.7z 2003.5z 446z 33374z 1492.1z
First-Stage F-statistics 348.5z
Anderson Likelihood-ratio statistic 705.0z
Cragg-Donald F statistic 1914.8z
Anderson-Rubin ￿2 Statistic 618.8z
Shea Partial R2 0.83
Sargen Over-identi￿cation Test 0.57
P-value of Sargen Over-identi￿cation Test 0.45
R2 0.97 0.96 0.95 0.94 0.96
Prob.>F or Prob.>￿2 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Notes: a. Numbers in parenthesis are the t (z)-values. **(*) denotes signi￿cance at 1 (5)%. z indicates
p-value of the statistic is less than 0.01.
b. Time-speci￿c and province-speci￿c ￿xed e⁄ects are included.
36Table 5: Estimates for Structural Parameters (1978-1992)
Econometric Methodsa (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) IV
Regressand (Urban Agricultural Consumption) OLS IV FE IV+FEb Included
Aggregate Exports (Ait) 0.19** 0.21** 0.14** 0.13** 0.20**
(3.89) (4.26) (5.67) (5.43) (4.02)
Product of Urban Wages and Elasticity (￿Wit) -0.002** -0.002** -0.002** -0.002** -0.002**
(30.30) (28.54) (21.16) (18.08) (16.42)
Investment in Capital Construction 0.016
(0.02)
Fixed Asset Investment in Innovation 0.249
(1.15)
F-statistics 1269.55z 1156.9z1 427.62z 364.28z 732.53z
First-Stage F-statistics 103.36z
Anderson Likelihood-ratio statistic 71.76z
Cragg-Donald F statistic 152.25z
Anderson-Rubin ￿2 Statistic 219.62 z
Shea Partial R2 0.74
Sargen Over-identi￿cation Test 0.17
P-value of Sargen Over-identi￿cation Test 0.68
R2 0.99 0.99 0.98 0.97
Prob.>F or Prob.>￿2 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Notes: a. Numbers in parenthesis are the t (z)-values. **(*) denotes signi￿cance at 1 (5)%. z indicates
p-value of the statistic is less than 0.01.
b. Year-speci￿c and province-speci￿c ￿xed e⁄ects are included.
37Table 6: Estimations for Di⁄erent Periods
Regressand: Exportsa (1) (2) (3) (4)
OLS IV FEb IV+FEb
Period 1949-1992
Total Exports (Tit) 0.01 0.01 0.02** 0.03**
(0.53) (1.17) (2.22) (2.33)
Product of Urban Wages and Elasticity (￿Wit) -19.61** -20.35** -22.71** -23.55**
(45.18) (32.98) (50.63) (33.91)
Period 1978-1992
Agricultural Exports (Ait) 0.19** 0.21** 0.14** 0.13**
(3.89) (4.26) (5.67) (5.43)
Product of Urban Wages and Elasticity (￿Wit) -0.002** -0.002** -0.002** -0.002**
(30.30) (28.54) (21.16) (18.08)
Period 1978-1984
Agricultural Exports (Ait) 0.08** 0.07** 0.04 0.03
(3.89) (5.26) (1.49) (1.18)
Product of Urban Wages and Elasticity (￿Wit) -0.00** -0.00** -0.01** -0.00**
(38.98) (18.44) (9.57) (4.01)
Period 1985-1992
Agricultural Exports (Ait) 0.27** 0.30 0.30** 0.17**
(5.05) (5.89) (6.18) (6.07)
Product of Urban Wages and Elasticity (￿Wit) -0.002** -0.002** -0.002** -0.002**
(24.11) (11.73) (25.92) (20.96)
Notes: a. Numbers in parenthesis are the t (z)-value. **(*) denotes signi￿cance at 1 (5)%.
b. Year-speci￿c and province-speci￿c ￿xed e⁄ects are included.
38.
Table 7: Identi￿cations of the Weights
Econometric Methods (1) (2) (3) (4)
OLS IV FE IV+FE
Whole Period
Weight on Urban Workers (￿) 101 67.7y 44.5y 39.5y
Weight on Future Investment (￿) 2062z 1424.3z 1031.7z 945.2z
Period 1978-1992
Weight on Urban Workers (￿) 6.40y 5.97y 5.83y 8.25
y
Weight on Future Investment (￿) 6.42z 5.99z 5.84z 8.26z
Period 1978-1984
Weight on Urban Workers (￿) 14.3y 14.5y 28.7 30.4
Weight on Future Investment (￿) 14.4z 14.6z 28.9z 30.6z
Period 1985-1992








Weight on Future Investment (￿) 4.71z 7.07z 4.32z 7.00z
Notes: Numbers in this table are calculated from Table 6. y(z) indicates that the estimate of ^ ￿1 (^ ￿2)
is signi￿cant at the 5% level. The parameters ￿ and ￿ are calculated from the corresponding estimated
coe¢ cients, ^ ￿1and ^ ￿2; by ￿ = 1= ^ ￿1 + 1 and ￿ = (1 ￿ ^ ￿2)=^ ￿1 + 1.
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